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This paper discusses the results of a study of the strategic interaction 
of Polaroid and Eastman-Kodak in the area of instant photography during 1975-
1978. The study aims to determine how useful the event-time methodology from 
financial economics is in studying complex strategic interactions by compari-
son with more traditional approaches. The study builds on the conceptual ef-
forts of Porter (1980, Chapters 4,5) and the methodological innovations of 
Ruback (1982). Overall the study demonstrates that the event-time methodology 
can be used to significantly improve our understanding of complex strategic 
interactions. 
THE PROBLEM 
Significant progress has been made during the past few years in quantify-
ing the impact of various strategies on the profitability of the firm. Sta-
tistical studies such as those by Schendel and Patton (1978), Galbraith and 
Stiles (1983), Bettis (1981), and Woo and Cooper (1982) among others have pro-
vided a basic understanding of the relationship between strategy and perfor-
mance. These studies have shared two general characteristics. First, they 
have used an accounting return as the performance measure. Typical of these 
accounting determined performance indicators have been return on equity, re-
turn on assets, or return on invested capital. Second, they have generally 
been cross-sectional studies that related performance to a series of strategy 
or strategy-related variables after correcting for other impacts on perfor-
mance (e.g., size and industry). Hence the output from these studies general-
ly can be thought of as a model of the average impact of strategy on perfor-
mance across a sample of firms. 
Although this general approach to empirically studying strategy has been 
highly useful in gaining various insights, it has several obvious 
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shortcomings. Large samples of firms are necessary. Sample sizes below 
thirty are almost non-existent. This precludes the study of many phenomena 
that are not characterized by numerous instances. Specification errors are an 
inherent risk since no general theoretical model of the relationship between 
strategy and performance exists. Modeling approaches vary among researchers. 
Independent variables are often significantly correlated• Relevant data such 
as market shares are often not available or unreliable. 
Furthermore, the use of accounting based returns as performance measures 
introduces conceptual and measurement problems. Normatively, according to 
financial and economic theory the objective of the management of the firm 
should be to maximize the market value of the firm. Hence, at least in a nor-
mative sense it is market value and not profitability that should be the meas-
ure of strategic effectiveness. The two are related (see for example, Beaver, 
Kettler and Scholes, 1970) but the correlation is far from perfect. The basic 
difference is that market value reflects the expectation of investors relative 
to the future performance of the firm (an ex ante measure) while accounting 
returns are essentially retrospective measures (ex post) of achieved perfor-
mance. As a simple example of the difference consider the fact that the stock 
of some high technology firms in recent years have traded in the market at 
high multiples of book value while consistently losing money. Such results 
represent the expectation of investors that these firms would eventually be 
very profitable (as many of them have become). 
The other problem with accounting returns is the general issue of mea-
surement. Because of differences in revenue recognition, inventory valuation 
depreciation methods and other varying accounting conventions and the use of 
historical cost for valuing assets, accounting returns can be substantially 
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biased. For an interesting discussion of many measurement problems associated 
with using accounting returns see Bentson (1985). 
Recently a few examples have occurred in the strategy literature that use 
the event-time methodology from financial economics which is based on the mar-
ket value of the firm (e.g., Montgomery, Thomas, and Kamath (1984); Montgomery 
and Singh (1984)). These studies also require samples of substantial size so 
that, by definition, "unique" situations cannot be studied. 
Neither the traditional approaches using accounting returns and large 
samples nor the event-time methodology using market value with large samples 
are currently applicable to empirically studying complex strategic interac-
tions that involve a unique sequence of moves by competing firms. For exam-
ple, consider a situation where competitor "A" in an industry with three par-
ticipants (A, B, C) announces a new product with improved performance. In 
reaction to this competitors "B" and "C" cut prices the following week by 15% 
and 25% respectively. Three months later it becomes obvious that company 
"A"'s new product is not selling because of reliability problems. Company "A" 
then announces a $20 million crash project to improve reliability to above in-
dustry averages while extending the 30 day warranty period to 1 year. A month 
later competitor "B" starts a massive advertising campaign stressing the re-
liability of their product relative to the competition. Almost simultaneously 
competitor "C" announces a joint venture with a Japanese firm to shift produc-
tion to a massive new Japanese plant to be completed in 6-8 months and cut 
prices by an additional 10%. Three weeks later Company "A" announces that it 
is suing Company "C" for patent infringement. 
A situation such as this hypothetical example cannot be studied using the 
traditional empirical approaches. However as Porter (1980, Chapters 4, 5) and 
others have pointed out such sequences of dynamic competitive moves are an 
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essential component of strategic competition in most industries. Such, situa-
tions can be partially modeled by the methods of modern game theory and can be 
studied using clinical research methods (case studies are resplendent with 
such ~ituations) but have not generally been approached empirically in the 
context of relating strategy or strategic moves to performance. Current em-
pirical studies of strategy and performance are focused at a much more macro 
level. They can investigate on the average what macro strategies (e.g., di-
versification strategy, level of vertical integration, differentiation versus 
low cost, etc.) over relatively long periods of time "tend to outperform" 
others, by how much, and under what conditions. However, they cannot be used 
to study the micro competitive dynamics of an industry as in the hypothetical 
example above. 
So, in summary, current approaches to studying the relationships between 
strategy and performance are limited to large samples. Large sample studies 
have yielded numerous valuable results but few have used the normatively cor-
rect firm value as a dependent variable and none can be used to study complex 
strategic interactions of the type discussed above. While clinical research 
can be used in these latter instances it is weakened by the inability to as-
sess the financial impact of various moves. The current study aims to deter-
mine if this situation with respect to strategic interaction can be improved 
upon to the point that assessments (crude perhaps, but useful) of financial 
impact can be made. 
THE METHODOLOGY 
The efficient-markets hypothesis (see, for example, Fama (1976)) posits 
that secruity prices reflect all available information. Therefore, unantici-
pated information, such as take-over bids, result in a change in the security 
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prices of the firm. Theoretically, this price change is an unbiased estimate 
of the present value of the change in future cash flows to the firm. 
It should be noted that anticipated changes cannot be unambiguously in-
terpreted since they involve changes in expectations over some period {the an-
ticipation period) prior to the actual change. Furthermore, when two or more 
pieces of information are released only the combined effect can be measured. 
These points will be discussed more later in the paper since the situation 
studied involves some anticipated changes and multiple simultaneous disclo-
sures. 
Given an efficient capital market, any intervention that will affect fu-
ture cash flows will cause a change in the firm's security prices as soon as 
the change is anticipated by investors in the capital market. This allows the 
possibility of, for example, security prices changing before the actual occur-
rence of the market intervention if its occurrence becomes likely or obvious 
or information about the possible occurrence of the intervention is "leaked" 
to the security market {i.e., anticipated changes as just discussed). 
In practice, the impact of an event on a firm's securities is measured by 
estimating the "normal" return to the stock in the absence of the event. The 
"abnormal" return to the stock then is the difference between the actual re-
turn and the normal return. This approach is what has generally been termed 
the time-event methodology commonly used by financial economists. It has been 
used in the fields of finance and accounting to study the effects on common 
stock prices of important economic events such as earnings and dividend an-
nouncements, capital structure changes, the merger announcements, and the 
listing decision (see, e.g., Boness et al. (1974), Dodd (1977), Fama et al. 
(1969), Masulis (1983), Petit {1972), and Wansley et al. {1983)). 
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The time-event methodology, pioneered by Fama, Fisher, Jensen and Roll 
(1968), rests on an equilibrium model of an individual firm's expected rate of 
return on equity. · Assuming that security returns have a multivariate normal 
distribution a single factor market model consistent with the well-known 
Sharpe-Lintner-Mossin capital asset pricing model (CAPM) can be formulated for 
time-event studies as: 
Rjt • aj + BjRmt + ejt (1) 
where: 
Rjt • rate of return on security or portfolio j over period t; 
Rmt = rate of return on a value-weighted market portfolio over period t; 
Bj • Cov(Rjt,Rmt)/Var(Rmt>, the systematic risk of portfolio or security 
j; 
ejt = the random disturbance term of the rate of return on security or 
portfolio j over period t, with E(ejt)zO. 
Since the disturbance term, ejtt represents the deviation of the rate of 
return in period t from the expected return, it is useful as a measure of the 
abnormal return. More specifically, in applying the above model to an event, 
the time surrounding the event is partitioned into two periods, an estimation 
period and an analysis period. The estimation period, which falls before the 
event, is used to estimate the parameters aj and Sj as the intercept and 
slope, respectively, by a regression model of firm returns against market 
returns. Given these estimates of aj and Sj, the prediction errors for each 
period t within the analysis period can be calculated as: 
(2) 
where aj and Sj are the time series ordinary least squares estimates from the 
prediction period. Rtj is, of course, the total return, and the term in pa-
renthesis is the estimate of the normal return. Therefore, PEjt measures the 
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abnormal performance at a given time during the analysis period due to the 
event. To measure the cumulative effect of an event upon the security's ab-
normal returns up to a specific time T within the analysis period, the 
cumulative prediction error (CPE) is computed: 
T 
CPET - L PEjk 
k=l 
(3) 
The CPE is usually taken as a proxy for abnormal performance over an in-
terval of the analysis period. The behavior of the CPE can be analyzed either 
visually or statistically to derive inferences regarding the impact of the 
event under study upon the security's returns. A significant upward (or 
downward) drift in the CPE can be taken as evidence of a positive (or nega-
tive) impact of the event in question on the excess risk-adjusted rate of re-
turn on a given security or portfolio. In general averages are taken across a 
portfolio, however, this prohibits detailed examination of the impact of an 
event on a particular firm or an event that is only relevant to a particular 
firm. 
It should be noted that CPE will provide useful inferences only if the 
security risk, e, does not change significantly between the estimation and 
analysis periods. If there is a significant shift in the security or port-
folio's systematic risk caused by the market intervention in question, a 
"moving-beta" CPE (see, for example, Bar-Yosef and Brown 1977) can be used to 
allow for the possibility that new significant information resulting from the 
market intervention might have caused a shift in the systematic risks. 
Ruback (1982) pioneered the use of statistical tests applied to estimates 
of abnormal returns for individual firms. Statistically, Ruback's approach 
was merely to test whether the returns during the analysis period associated 
with a particular event were different from the forecasted returns derived 
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from the estimation equation. There is a well-known statistical approach to 
this problem (e.g., Neter and Wasserman, 1974, PP• 71-75). An unbiased esti-
mator of the variance of prediction error is 
+ ! + <Rmt - Am> Var(PEjt) • MSE(1 m (m-1)Var(Rm)) 
where: 
MSE • mean squared error or the residual variance from 
the market model regression; 
M • number of observations used to estimate the 
market model regression; 
Rmt = actual market return on day t; and 
Rm • average market return over the estimation period. 
Given this variance a t-statistic is easily calculated as: 




Ruback found it necessary to take the sum of the returns on the day be-
fore and the actual event day in three of his twelve events because of early 
leakage of information as denoted by large returns the day before an event 
day. 
AN EXAMPLE AND MODEL OF STRATEGIC INTERACTION 
The example selected for study was the Polaroid and Kodak strategic in-
teraction in instant photography during 1976 and 1977 and the surrounding time 
period. This particular competitive situation was chosen for a number of rea-
sons. There is a classic case series (Porter, 1983a; Porter and Fuller, 1978) 
which describes the situation and its evolution, and has been widely taught 
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and appears in several Business Policy casebooks (e.g., Christensen, et al., 
1985). 
Polaroid is a single product (instant photography) firm while Eastman Ko-
dak is diversified around a core photography business. This permits studying 
the pure impact of the strategic interaction on the market value of a firm 
since there are no other businesses but instant photography in which Polaroid 
competes. Hence, any market value change in Polaroid detected after correct-
ing for the impact of the overall market unambiguously results from develop-
ments in instant photography. By contrast, Kodak at the start of the interac-
tion has almost no stake in instant photography but seeks to gain a substan-
tial if not dominant position. It should, however, be remembered that Kodak's 
picture developing business was under increasing attack by the instant photo-
graphy. Hence, market value changes in Kodak detected after correcting for 
the overall market cannot be unambiguously ascribed to developments in instant 
photography. This presents the opportunity to see if the event-time method-
ology can be used in the presence of significant "noise" from other busi-
nesses. This is the general problem faced in using stock prices to study any 
diversified firm. Overall the asymmetry between Polaroid (single business) 
and Eastman-Kodak (related diversifier) provides an interesting test of the 
power of the methodology under varying levels of noise resulting from diver-
sification. 
A third reason for choosing this particular example was that it involved 
apparent attempts by the firms to use selective disclosure of information to 
impact their own and their competitor's stock price. At certain points in the 
competition facts are misrepresented and bluffing occurs. Bettis (1983) has 
suggested that such information disclosure and manipulation is an element of 
strategy that has been largely ignored by the strategic management research. 
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A final reason for choosing instant photography in 1976 and 1977 was the 
availability of an overall model from game theory, the prisoner's dilemma, 
that captures some of the more important features of the specific situation 
and can potentially be generalized to other situations. This model will be 
discussed in more detail below, but first a brief description of the actual 
situation will be useful. 
Polaroid and Kodak Battle in Instant Photography 
The sequence of events studied involved the strategic interaction of 
Polaroid Eastman-Kodak in the area of instant photography. As mentioned above 
this particular strategic interaction is the subject of a well-known case se-
ries that has been used at numerous business schools to teach the basic con-
cepts of market signaling and competitive moves (see Porter 1980, especially 
chapters 4, 5). Since a good chronology of events is available and since the 
general nature of the interaction is well-known to scholars in the area of 
strategic management only a brief description focussing on key events will be 
discussed in the present paper. 
Table 1 lists the key events of the interaction as gleaned from the case 
studies. Prior to 1976 Polaroid had faced no serious competition in instant 
photography. In 1974 Kodak for the first time revealed that it was working on 
its own system of instant film and cameras. This may have been intended to 
signal to Polaroid to move more cautiously since instant photography was 
starting to hurt Kodak's lucrative developing business and/or it may have been 
an announcement of actual intentions. Whatever it was, in February of 1976 
Kodak announced the Kodak instant. This occurred in the annual report which 
had four full pages on the Kodak system. Since Kodak has a December 31 year 
end, the annual report probably went to press sometime in late January, 1976. 
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On April 20, 1976 Kodak demonstrated two new instant cameras and film at 
a press conference in the grand ballroom of the Pierre Hotel in New York City. 
Walter A. Fallon, president of Kodak described the two new cameras and instant 
film as offering "remarkable color quality" to the consumer. Dr. Albert Sieg, 
who led the development effort, stated that the chemistry of the new film was 
"fundamentally new" (Porter, 1983a). 
A week later, at Kodak's annual meeting, Fallon made numerous enthusias-
tic statements in response to stockholder questions about the instant system. 
Later in the day at a luncheon for security analysts, Fallon dismissed the va-
lidity of a Polaroid patent suit (Porter, 1983a). 
On July 21, 1976, a Kodak spokesman made enthusiastic statements about 
the level of dealer orders far exceeding expectations and straining production 
capacity. At this same time rumors were circulating about Kodak experiencing 
considerable problems at its production facilities (Porter and Fuller, 1978). 
In August of 1976 Polaroid unveiled two new cameras but did not cut 
prices to or below the Kodak levels (Porter and Fuller, 1978). 
On October 19, 1976, President Fallon commented at a meeting of Securi-
ties Analysts of San Francisco: 
No new product in our history has received the attention 
given to the family of instant products introduced by 
Kodak in April of this year ••• In all, we will have manu-
factured and shipped more than one million Kodak instant 
cameras by the end of 1976, with the bulk of those ship-
ments taking place between now and the end of this year. 
For 1977, our production will increase by a factor of sev-
eral times. A substantial body of market research tells 
us these products will move quickly through the hands of 
retailers to consumers. That research ••• reveals an 
overwhelmingly positive response to Kodak instant products 
(Fallon, 1976). 
On February 17, 1977 announced several new products, but maintained 
prices above comparable Kodak products. On March 23, 1977 Kodak unveiled 17 
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new products. Douglass C. Harvey, Kodak executive vice president and general 
manager of the u.s. and Canadian Photographic Division reiterated the compa-
ny's commitment to instant photography and added that over one million Kodak 
instant cameras had been sold in the u.s. and that reaction to them had thus 
far been overwhelmingly favorable (Porter and Fuller, 1978). 
On April 22, 1977, contrary to previous statements, Eastman Kodak an-
nounced via the annual report disappointing results for 1976. Preliminary re-
sults for the first quarter of 1977 were also released and showed a 20% fall 
in net earnings on a 5% rise in sales from the same quarter in 1976. On the 
previous day Kodak announced a furlough program to reduce employment by 150 at 
its instant film manufacturing facility. Industry sources estimated that 
Kodak only sold 570,000 cameras at retail by December 31, 1976 (Porter and 
Fuller, 1978). 
On April 26, 1977 Eastman-Kodak and Polaroid held simultaneous annual 
meetings. Kodak made some conciliatory measures toward Polaroid. Polaroid, 
probably unaware of Kodak's conciliatory gestures, announced a large price cut 
to below the prices for comparable Kodak products (Porter and Fuller, 1978). 
The preceding discussion summarized in Table 1 is not intended to capture 
the richness of the actual case series. (Interested readers should consult 
the cases.) Furthermore, it is not intended to summarize all of the events 
that impact equity values for the two firms. A more thorough summary of 
events that may impact firm values will be presented later as part of the 
data. The discussion is intended to acquaint or reacquaint readers with some 
of the basic features of the competition in instant photography and provide a 
basis for the discussion of the model that follows. 
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Modeling the Battle 
As Porter (1983a) has pointed out the competition in instant photography 
is an example of the classic Prisoners' Dilemma from game theory. (See Luce 
and Raiffa, 1957; Rapoport and Chammah, 1965.) The term "Prisoner's Dilemma" 
comes from the anecdote that is usually used to illustrate this game. Two 
prisoners are held incommunicado and charged with the same crime. Each has 
the option of squealing on the other or maintaining silence. If they both 
maintain silence, they both go free. If they both squeal, they both are 
punished (the anecdote usually specifies hanging). If one prisoner talks 
and the other does not, the squealer not only gets off scot-free but also 
collects a handsome reward. The prisoner who holds out is convicted on the 
strength of the other's testimony and is punished. It is obviously in the 
interest of each to squeal no matter what the other does, but it is in their 
collective interest to hold out. As Rapoport and Chammah (1965) have shown 
there is no easy or satisfactory solution to the paradox of this game. The 
natural and logical individual incentives are for each to squeal and betray 
their collective interest. 
Drawing on Porter's (1983b) analysis Figure 1 allows us to place this 
game in the context of the Polaroid-Kodak situation. As this exhibit shows 
each firm can either choose to "fight" or seek "detente". If both choose to 
fight the payoffs are very low for both. If both choose to seek ··detente" the 
payoffs are moderate for both. The "fight/detente" situations are inherently 
unstable and unlikely to be no more than a short-term situation before evolv-
ing into ••detente/detente•• or, more likely "fight/fight". The situation is 
further complicated by the necessity to hide, signal or bluff intentions 
through various competitive moves to the competitor. Misinterpretation of the 
intended moves of ' the competitor is a constant hazard. Furthermore, there are 
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questions of how much commitment lies behind each move and how to communicate 
that commitment. 
Furthermore, more along the lines of classic economic theory the entry of 
Kodak into instant photography represents the destruction of the virtual 
monopoly that Polaroid held in instant photography and its replacement by a 
duopoly. Following directly from classical economic theory, this reduction 
in Polaroid's monopoly power should lower the returns to below the level that 
a monopolistic market structure can support. (This formulation of the situa-
tion and the prisoner's dilemma formulation discussed above are largely equiv-
alent in their implications.) 
Both formulations of the Polaroid-Kodak competitive situation, the pris-
oner's dilemma and the destruction of a monopoly, raise interesting explor-
atory issues for the present research. Both suggest that the equilibrium re-
turns on equity that Polaroid will earn in the new (duopolistic) market struc-
ture will be significantly less than Polaroid earned under the old (monopolis-
tic) market structure. (It should be noted that this does not necessarily 
need to be true during the transition between equilibria. Increased rivalry 
during this period may stimulate primary demand.) In simple terms, competi-
tion will ultimately reduce profits. Since market returns represent the esti-
mate of the market for the present value of the future economic earnings of 
the firm, inevitably the value of Polaroid must fall to reflect the new equi-
librium market structure. An interesting exploratory issue is when the market 
recognizes this and corrects the value of Polaroid downward. In other words 
when does the market recognize the inevitability of a new market structure. 
This recognition by the market is complicated by the incentives to release 
false or misleading information in an intense competitive situation. Further-
more, the question arises of when the market judges Kodak's entry to be 
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successful. An unsuccessful entry by Kodak would not only restore Polaroid's 
monopoly situation, but likely discourage other likely entrants that lack 
Kodak's enormous resources. 
DATA, ANALYSIS, AND RESULTS 
The time-event methodology was used with daily return data. Daily data 
for Polaroid, Kodak, and a value-weighted market index were obtained from the 
CRSP tapes. In a sense these values constituted the !!! dependent variables. 
Correspondingly, events such as those listed in Table 1 constituted the inde-
pendent variables that caused the abnormal returns for Polaroid and Kodak. 
However, it would be dangerous to believe that a set of events gleaned from a 
set of teaching cases was close to complete or sufficient in terms in informa-
tion that impacted firm values through the equity markets. Hence a more 
thorough list was needed of information that might impact market value. For 
this reason the Wall Street Journal Index was selected as a source of more 
complete information. All entries during 1976 and 1977 were studied and those 
that appeared to have any reasonable potential to impact market valuation for 
either company were recorded. (This included events unrelated to instant 
photography.) These events appear chronologically in Table 2. Whenever there 
was some doubt about whether the event should be included the decision was to 
include it. 
Given the data from the CRSP tapes, regressions were run to estimate the 
parameters of the single-factor market model in Equation 1 for both Polaroid 
and Eastman-Kodak using daily data for 1975. The results appear in Table 3. 
It should be noted that the regression for Polaroid explains only 22% of the 
variance. However, for both firms the coefficient ~ is statistically signif-
icant, which indicates that the firms returns are related to market returns. 
- 16 -
Overall, the results are typical of those reported in the finance literature 
(e.g., Marsules, 1983). 
The use of the equations in Table 3 to calculate abnormal returns for 
1976 and 1977 will provide useful results only if the B's did not change be-
tween 1975 and the following years. To check this regressions were also run 
for 1976 and 1977 (and other years) as summarized in Table 4. The so-called 
"Chow Test" (see Fisher, 1970, for a formal derivation) was run. The results 
failed to detect any significant difference between 1975 and either 1976 or 
1977 for either firm. 
The regressions summarized in Table 3 were then used to calculate the cu-
mulative prediction errors for the analysis period, as an estimate of the cu-
mulative abnormal returns as specified by equations (2) and (3). The result-
ing estimates of the cumulative abnormal returns are shown plotted against 
time in Figure 2. Specifically on the time scale observation 1 denotes the 
first trading day of 1976, observation 2 the second trading day of 1976 and so 
forth. Figure 2 is intended for visual inspection and interpretation. 
The plots of the estimated cumulative abnormal returns shown in Figure 2 
display some interesting patterns. Shortly after the first of the year (1976) 
Polaroid seems to recognize a positive abnormal return of 8-10% while Kodak 
dropped by 10-14%. The total difference of roughly 20% narrows as the antici-
pated unveiling of Kodak's instant camera approaches in April 1976. In early 
April Kodak's abnormal return has improved slightly to a negative 8% while 
Polaroid has decayed from a +10% abnormal return in early March to a negative 
return of over 12% by April 20 (observation 76). On April 20 Kodak unveiled 
its instant picture cameras and disclosed its strategy for challenging Polar-
oid. From this "declaration of war" to roughly the middle of May, 1977 (May 
11, 1977 corresponds to observation 344) or for approximately 13 1/2 months 
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Kodak displays a surprisingly uniform slide as the war rages ending up with a 
cumulative negative abnormal return of over 76% on May 11t 1977. Kodak stayed 
at roughly this level throughout the rest of 1977. Meanwhilet Polaroid's for-
tunes rise from a negative cumulative return of over 12% on April 20t 1976 to 
a positive figure of over 23% on October 7t 1976 (observation 195). Within 
just a few days Polaroid fell to about a 10% cumulative abnormal return. This 
fall corresponded to an optomistic session Fallon (Kodak CEO) had with securi-
ty analysts and anticipation of "flat" third quarter profits for Polaroid (see 
events 22 and 23 in Table 2). After this decline Polaroid appears to maintain 
approximately a positive 10%-12% cumulative abnormal return with some moderate 
fluctuations in each direction. 
In sum the plots of Figure 2 seem to be clearly indicating that beginning 
in April of 1976 Kodak increasingly was losing the war with Polaroid in the 
judgement of the market. It appears that the market is suggesting that Kodak 
is getting deeper and deeper into a competition with Polaroid that it cannot 
win. 
To complement the visual analysis of Figure 2 a series of statistical 
tests were also run. Using the test for significance discussed previously a 
two-tailed test at the 10% level was run on all of the daily returns in the 
analysis period. Following Ruback (1982) the authors decided to associate 
with each event the returns on the day it appeared in The Wall Street Journal 
and the returns on the two previous days. This was done since often informa-
tion appeared in The Wall Street Journal the day after the actual event (e.g.t 
the results of a management meeting with security analysts) and leakage could 
have easily occurred the day before that. Table 5 lists all of the returns 
that were found to be significant. Table 6 lists the abnormal returns associ-
ated with each event from table 1 using the 3-day window discussed above. 
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The returns on a total of 73 days were found to be significant. Of these 
73 significant returns, 34 returns or 46.6% could be associated with a partic-
ular event using the three day window methodology discussed earlier. Table 6 
lists the actual significant returns for each three day window associated with 
each event from table 2. The significant returns were cumulated for each 
three day period and the cumulative listed in table 2 for each firm and event. 
Out of the 52 events a total of 34 or 65.4% could be associated with signifi-
cant abnormal returns. At the end of the two year analysis period Polaroid 
had an estimated cumulative abnormal return of +10.7% while Kodak stood at 
-82.6%. The cumulative figures for the significant returns listed in Table 5 
were -2.6% and -34.2% respectively. Furthermore, the cumulative figures for 
the significant returns associated with an event in Table 2 were -8.8% and 
-50.8% respectively. 
Discussion 
The estimated cumulative abnormal returns in Figure 2 and the statistical 
tests in Tables 2, 5, 6 demonstrate that it is possible to use financial re-
turns to partially assess the impact of strategic interaction in general and 
of specific stratigic moves in particular. However, the picture the meth-
odology paints of the interaction is valuable but incomplete. Of the 73 sta-
tistically significant daily returns in Table 5, about 54% could not be asso-
ciated with a particular event. Furthermore, of 52 key events in Table 2, 
about 35% could not be associated with any significant returns. In addition 
some of the events fell close together in time and hence returns could not be 
unambiguously assigned a particular event in some cases. 
This lack of a one-to-one mapping of key events to .significant abnormal 
returns raises several methodological issues. First, it is unlikely that 
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abnormal returns associated with key events that fall on the same or closely 
adjacent days can be unambiguously separated. Second, for some of those re-
turns (Table 5) that could not be associated with an event, it is likely that 
a more thorough search of archival sources (e.g., local newspapers at plant 
locations) would have uncovered some events that were not documented in The 
Wall Street Journal. However, it is also likely that some of the significant 
returns were movements in anticipation of future events and not responses to 
undocumented events. (In this regard the plots in Figure 2 give more of an 
overall view of the unfolding of excess returns associated with the general 
competition rather than tied to a specific chain of events.) Furthermore 
movements in anticipation of events before they occur no doubt result in some 
events in Table 2 not being associated with excess returns since the returns 
may have occurred in anticipation weeks or months earlier. Also, the move-
ments actually associated with an event may be correcting the anticipations 
rather than responding to the actural event. 
The overall problem with anticipated returns is perhaps the thorniest is-
sue raised by using the time-event methodology to model complex strategic in-
teractions. It corresponds roughly to problems of specification and multi-
collinearity encountered in using more traditional large sample approaches to 
the quantitiative study of strategy. In both cases it is incumbent on the re-
searcher to be aware of the problem and make what adjustments may be called 
for in the interpretation of the results. It should also be noted that many 
events cannot be anticipated (e.g., surprise announcements) and hence can be 
fully modeled with the methodology used in the present paper. Given an aware-
ness of the general nature of the "anticipated returns" problem with the mod-
eling of financial returns we now turn to a discussion of some of the sub-
stance of the results as it relates to Eastman-Kodak and Polaroid. 
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The estimated 3-day cumulative abnormal returns (CAR's) associated with 
key events in Table 2 provide several interesting insights. 
The actual start of direct competition was signaled by event 9 on April 
21, 1976 when Kodak unveiled its instant picture camera and disclosed its 
strategy for challenging Polaroid. Interestingly Polaroid recognized a 
positive CAR of 11.3% while Kodak had a negative CAR of 3.4%. The camera and 
strategy obviously did not live up to expectations. One can speculate that 
this could have been an early signal of problems to Kodak. Similarly, when 
Kodak introduced another instant camera (event 34) about one year later it re~ 
ceived a CAR of -1.9%. By contrast, when Polaroid "strongly hinted" that it 
would soon demonstrate its long awaited motion picture system it recognized a 
+5. 3% CAR. 
In addition to these competitive moves in the product market, the battle 
was waged in a series of legal moves. Events 11, 13, 14, 16, 17, 19, 27, 30, 
35 and 41 all involve legal moves (primarily patents). Excess returns were 
associated with six of these ten legal events. Similarly, other competitive 
moves (e.g., events 12 and 33) resulted in abnormal returns. 
Perhaps one of the most interesting aspects of the interaction involves 
the apparent use of information disclosure and in some cases possible misrep-
resentation as a weapon. For example, earlier in (page 10) the current paper 
the President of Kodak is quoted from an address to security analysts in which 
he disclosed an "overwhelming positive response to Kodak instant products" and 
forecast sales of over 1 million units by end of the year which was about 2-
1/2 .months away. This event which is noted as event 22 in Table 2 apparently 
caused a negative 5.6 CAR in Polaroid's stock. Hence, the Kodak CEO was able 
to inflict substantial damage on Polaroid by simply making a very positive 
statement about Kodak's instant camera business. Furthermore, the statement 
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turned out to be incorrect. Kodak had a disastrous fourth quarter and sold 
only 570,000 cameras by year end. It would appear that Fallon was misrepre-
senting or bluffing. At any rate on April 25, 1977 (event 40) Kodak released 
financial information for 1976 and the first quarter of 1977 that showed how 
wrong Fallon had been. This event caused a 7.9% negative CAR for KOdak. 
Another interesting aspect of the competition disclosed by Table 2 is the 
impact of security analysts. Consider event 10 as an example where analysts 
are quoted as viewing Kodak entry into instant photography positively. This 
event was associated with a one day negative CAR of 5.3% for Polaroid. 
The immediately preceding examples illustrate how useful the statistical 
test methodology can be for gaining insight into various competitive moves in 
the interaction. (The interested reader should examine all 52 events in Table 
2.) In particular it would appear to be a useful assessment tool that firms 
could use to determine the impact of various competitive moves. 
By contrast with the detailed microscopic look at individual events that 
the statistical tests provide the graphs of Figure 2 provide a more general 
view of the overall evolving impact of the competition. In particular the 
graphical analysis should be useful in studying the essence of the evolving 
situation as a prisoner's dilemma game or as the change of structure from mo-
nopoly to duopoly as discussed earlier. Following from the earlier discussion 
these graphs would be expected to capture the declining profit potential of 
Polaroid as its monopoly position is eroded. The graph of Polaroid's CAR's 
most definitely do not capture this. In fact Polaroid ends 1977 with a posi-
tive CAR of about 10%. By contrast it is striking how consistently Kodak de-
clines from April 1976 till about May of 1977 when the CAR's are greater than 
-70%. This pattern in both stocks is unexpected based on the previously dis-
cussed models of the situation. 
- 22 -
Why isn't Polaroid experiencing negative CAR's and why is Kodak? No sin-
gle definitive answer can be advanced, but two plausible explanations can be 
obtained by examining Tables 7 and 8. Table 7 shows the return on equity for 
both firms from 1974 through 1983, while Table 8 shows the closing equity 
prices and percentage changes for both firms and the S&P 500 index. As Table 
7 shows Polaroid's ROE is rebounding from low levels during 1974, while 
Kodak's ROE is on the decline during 1976 and 1977. This suggests that the 
patterns of Figure 2 merely reflect changes in current earnings. This is a 
bothersome explanation for Polaroid though since Polaroid's average yearly 
earnings for 1979 through 1983 drop to less than one-half of their average 
1976-1977 earnings. This drop probably reflects the destruction of Polaroid's 
monopoly position in instant photography. The question, though, still remains 
as to why Polaroid's excess returns do not reflect this during 1976 and 1977. 
Examination of Table 8 provides a tentative explanation. This table suggests 
that Polaroid suffered substantial negative excess returns during 1974 and 
1975. These were probably in anticipation of Kodak's entry into instant pho-
tography. The 1976 and 1977 positive returns can then be seen as a correction 
of earlier anticipations which were overly pessimistic about the competitive 
outcome. 
The pattern of returns for Kodak are also bothersome. Here the diversi-
fied nature of the firm undoubtedly plays a role along with earlier anticipa-
tions of the market. 
Conclusion 
This paper has demonstrated the usefulness and limitations of the time-
event approach in studying complex strategic interaction. The methodology for 
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identifying key events and associating abnormal returns provided useful in-
sights. When coupled with the case material it provided an interesting analy-
sis of the individual moves in the competitive interaction. The plots of the 
cumulative abnormal returns provided an interesting overview of the financial 
impact of the competition. Plots such as these could provide corporate 
managers with insight into evolving competitive situations if updated on a 
regular (e.g., weekly) basis. 
Some significant limitations were encountered with the methodology. 
First, The Wall Street Journal index appeared to be an incomplete source of 
potential key events. A more thorough search of primary sources could rectify 
this. Second, the diversified nature of Kodak introduced some "noise" into 
the analysis. However, as Table 2 documents it was still possible to associ-
ate abnormal returns with Kodak's instant photography business in many cases. 
Finally, the general problems associated with market anticipation of future 
events introduced significant problems. These could have been partially over-
come by using a longer window than two years. A window from 1970 to 1977 pos-
sibly could have captured much of the anticipated returns. 
Overall the methodology seems to offer substantial promise. It can be 
used to examine unique strategic interactions where large samples are, by 
definition, not available. Furthermore, it adds quantitative rigor and 
insight to the qualitative considerations inherent in case studies. In 
combination with such studies it would seem to be particularly useful. 
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Figure 1 
Prisoners' Dilemma for Polaroid and Kodak 
Kodak Options: 
1) Fight. Go aggressively for a large share. 
2) Detente. Accept a modest share. 
Polaroid Options: 
1) Fight. Aggressively protect its dominance. 
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Important "Events" in Polaroid-Kodak Interaction 
Drawn from the Published Case Studies 
A. April 20, 1976 
B. April 27, 1976 
c. July 21, 1976 
D. August 1976 
E. October 19, 1976 
F. February 17, 1977 
G. March 23, 1977 
H. April 22, 1977 
I. April 26, 1977 
Kodak demonstrates instant camera and announces 
plans. 
Kodak annual meeting. Many enthusiastic statements 
from Kodak executives. 
Kodak spokesman says level of dealer orders far 
exceeds expectations. 
Polaroid unveils two new cameras, but does not cut 
prices to or below Kodak prices. 
Chairman of Kodak makes enthusiastic statement 
about results to date. 
Polaroid announces several new products, but still 
maintains price umbrella over Kodak. 
Kodak unveils 17 new products. 
Kodak announces disastrous results for 1976 
contrary to previous statements. 
Kodak and Polaroid hold simultaneous annual meet-
ing. Kodak makes conciliatory gestures. Polaroid 














Key Events From Wall Street Journal Index 
1976-1977 
Profit for 1975 probably about doubled from 
$28.4 million, or 86 cents a share, earned in 
1974; sales hit high. (Polaroid) 
Earned $614 million in 1975, down about 3% from 
$630 million the prior year; net in fourth quar-
ter dropped to $204 million, or $1.26 a share 
from $220 million, or $1.36 a share. (Kodak) 
Fourth quarter profit jumped 166% to $24.7 
million, or 76 cents a share, compared with 
$9.3 million, or 28 cents a share, a year 
before. (Polaroid) 
Introduced Tele-Instamatic camera with new 
features. (Kodak) 
Imminent introduction of instant camera, recent 
successful debut of office copier among factors 
that should make 1976 a good year for firm, 
Walter Fallon, president, said. (Kodak) 
Heard on the Street: Firm's report titillates 
analysts with photo from new instant camera; 
stock price leans. (Kodak) 
To unveil its instant cameras and film for self-
developing color prints. (Kodak) 
Polaroid Corp. seen wary, worried as it girds 
for Kodak arrival in instant-photo field. 
(Polaroid) 
Unveiled its instant-picture cameras and dis-
closed its strategy for challenging monopoly 
Polaroid Corp. has held for 28 years. (Kodak) 
Heard on the Street: Bid by Kodak for share 
of Polaroid's market gains respect as analysts 
focus on entry. (Polaroid) 
Polaroid Corp. filed suit against Eastman 
Kodak Co. alleging infringement of 10 
Polaroid patents by Kodak's new instant 



















Table 2 (continued) 




Polaroid may allow other companies to make 
cameras using its instant SX-70 film. (Polaroid) 
Kodak claimed Polaroid's patents on instant-
photo products are invalid and unenforceable. 
(Polaroid) 
Filed suit in London against Eastman Kodak Co. 
and Kodak Ltd., alleging infringement of 10 
Polaroid patents. (Polaroid) 
Heard on the Street: Eastman Kodak Firm's 1976 
profit estimates being pared due to disappoint-
ment with second quarter gain. (Polaroid) 
Heard on the Street: British judge holding hear-
ings of bid by company for injunction against 
production or sale by Kodak in U.K. of new instant 
camera, pending patent-infringement suit. (Polaroid) 
British court granted temporary injunction to com-
pany's British unit against British unit of Eastman 
Kodak Co. making and selling in Britain its 'instant 
picture' cameras and films. (Polaroid) 
Heard on the Street: Japan's Fuji Photo Film Co. 
beats Eastman with color film that doesn't need 
flash in most situations. (Kodak) 
Polaroid sued Eastman Kodak Co., its Canadian sub-
sidiary for infringing 10 Canadian patents protect-
ing Polaroid's instant cameras, film. (Polaroid) 
Fuji Photo-Film Co. developed camera with film for 
instant photography that it asserted can compete 
with Polaroid and Kodak. (Polaroid) 
Polaroid Corp. wins in U.K. court arose from tech-
nicalities; interim ban of firm's instant products 
wasn't based on substance, judge explained. 
(Polaroid) 
Kodak expects good Christmas business, Walter A. 





















Table 2 (continued) 




Heard on the Street: Polaroid's flat third 
quarter operating profit cast doubt on basis .for 
many estimates. (Polaroid) 
Heard on the Street: Competition of instant camera 
market dominated by Polaroid Oorp. apparently heat-
ing up as Eastman Kodak Corp.'s ability to supply 
its new cameras to dealers increases. (Polaroid) 
Polaroid received boost in its instant-picture war 
with Eastman Kodak when Consumer Research magazine 
found "fading" problem with Kodak's instant color 
film. (Polaroid) 
Kodak told retailers "fading" not significant prob-
lem with company's new instant camera color photo-
graphs. (Kodak) 
British appeals court overturned lower court order 
restraining firm from introducing its instant film, 
cameras into U.K. (Kodak) 
Mutual funds made clear-cut choice in Polaroid-
Eastman Kodak battle during third quarter. (Kodak) 
Eastman Kodak and Xerox announced exchange of world-
wide patent licenses covering copiers, copier sup-
plies, and photosensitive elements used in machines. 
(Kodak) 
Polaroid losts its British court battle for tempo-
rary order to block sale of instant cameras by 
Eastman Kodak in Britain. (Polaroid) 
-5.6 
Net for 1976 climb 27% to record $79.7 million or +5.3 
$2.43 a share; fourth quarter net rose 29% to $31.9 
million or .98 a share, also a record; unveiled seven 
instant cameras. (Polaroid) 
Polaroid strongly hinted it will demonstrate its 
long waited motion picture system at its April 26 
meeting. (Polaroid) 
Sears, Roebuck & Oo. began selling private label 




















Table 2 (continued) 




Kodak announced new low-priced instant camera, 
a high speed color-print film, 15 other amateur 
photographic products. (Kodak) 
Kodak received civil investigative demand for docu-
ments from Justice Department in connection with 
investigation into firm's photographic business. 
(Kodak) 
Plans to lay off 380 employees in its Rochester 
facilities division. (Kodak) 
Will introduce a motor-driven camera for SX-70 
instant color pictures in June with suggested 
list price of about $40. (Polaroid) 
Earnings in first quarter rose 33% from year 
earlier, with per share net setting record for 
period; sales gained 5%. (Polaroid) 
To reduce its instant film work force by 150 
employees through rotating furlough plan begin-
ning April 25. (Kodak) 
Reported 20% decline in first quarter net on 5% 
sales increase from year earlier; net for 12 weeks 
ended March 20 totaled $94.2 million, or 58 cents 
a share. (Kodak) 
Polaroid and Kodak held exploratory talks about pos-
sible settlement of their patent disputes, Walter A. 
Fallon, Kodak Chairman, told annual meeting. (Kodak) 
Kodak offers dealer, consumer rebates to spur sales 
of its instant-photographic products. (Kodak) 
Heard on the Street: Kodak sparks investors jitters 
as price nears critical low and battle with Polaroid 
blazes. (Kodak) 
Changing Pictures: Firm, no longer the undisputed 














51 ) 1 0-2 1-77 
52) 11-23-77 
Table 2 (continued) 




Chief counsel of Berkey Photo, Inc., outlined 
Berkey Photo's case in opening statement as jury 
trial of its $300 million antitrust lawsuit against 
firm begain in federal court. (Kodak) 
Second quarter net rose 11% to record $20.5 million 
or 62 cents a share; first half net climbed 19% to 
record $34.5 million or $1.05 a share. (Polaroid) 
Raised dividend 60% to 20 cents a share from 12 1/2 
cents payable September 24 to stock of record 
September 1. (Polaroid) 
Heard on the Street: Polaroid's record results fail 
to quell doubts of analysts as some shade estimates 
for 1977. (Polaroid) 
Eastman Kodak, following lead of Xerox Corp., an-
nounced new rental, leasing plans in U.S. for its 
plain-paper copier-duplicators that it said would 
benefit customers who make many copies, use at least 
four machines, sign up for longer leases. (Kodak) 
Adding four pictures to its standard 20-exposure 
roll of 35 millimeter color print film, a 20% in-
crease on the roll, and increasing price of film 
by 10%. (Kodak) 
Third period growth in film sales exceeded espec-
tations, Colby H. Chandler, president, told secur-
ities analysts. (Kodak) 
To give two-week leaves to 1,3000 construction 
workers in Rochester, N.Y., over a five month 
period because it's putting off some "non-critical" 









Market !t:>del Regression Coefficients for 
Polaroid and Kodak 
(estimated using daily data for 1975) 
... 
aj Bj R2 















Market Model Regression Parameters for 
Polaroid and Kodak 





1974 1.35 .58 1.81 .26 
1975 1.47 • 62 1.76 .22 
1976 1. 41 .so 1. 82 .26 
1977 1.73 .38 1.89 • 31 
1978 1.86 .56 2.40 .53 
1979 1.30 .47 1.83 .24 
1980 .98 • 31 1.13 .20 
1981 1.09 .43 1.28 .19 
Table 5 
Daily Abnormal Returns Significant 
At 10% Level 

















































Table 5 (continued) 
Daily Abnormal Returns Significant 
At 10% Level (cont.) 

































*These significant abnormal returns were not associated with a 
particular event using the methodology of this paper. 
Table 6 
Significant Daily Abnormal Returns That Can Be 
Associated With an Event From Table 
Polaroid Kodak 
Event Observation t-2 t-1 t t-2 t-1 t 
I* 9 




6 57 -5.5 
7* 72 
8 75 -.016 
9** 77 +.113 -.034 




14 118 -.029 -.021 
15 142 -.018 -.016 
16** 152 -.019 
17** 153 -.019 
18 176 -.022 
19** 188 -.023 
20** 190 -.023 
21* 195 
22** 204 -.056 
23** 205 -.056 
24 210 -.020 +.020 
25 215 -.028 
26 218 +. 023 +.016 
27 219 +.016 
28 227 -.018 
29* 239 
30* 246 
31 288 +.053 
32 289 +.053 +.033 
33 304 -.022 
34 311 -.019 
35 316 -.028 
36* 322 
37* 322 
38** 330 -.025 -.035 
39** 331 -.035 
4o** 332 -.035 -.044 
41* 334 
42* 343 
43 345 -.025 
44* 388 
Table 6 (continued) 
Significant Daily Abnormal Returns That Can Be 
Associated With an Event From Table 
Polaroid Kodak 
Event Observation t-2 t-1 t t-2 t-1 t 
45** 390 -.019 





51 457 -.053 -.023 -.029 
52 480 +.018 
*These events could not be associated with any particular abnormal returns 
using the methodology of this paper. 
**Adjacent events with two asterisks on each indicate that the events 
overlapped using the methodology of the paper. In other words, the 3-day 
windows overlapped. This occurred for 13 out of 34 events that were 
associated with abnormal returns. 
Table 7 
Return on Equity 
Year Eastman Kodak Polaroid. 
1974 18.4% 4.5% 
1975 16.6 9.1 
1976 16.2 10.6 
1977 14.9 11.2 
1978 18.6 12.9 
1979 18.6 3.9 
1980 19.1 8.8 
1981 18.3 3.3 
1982 15.4 2.6 
1983 7.5 5.4 
Source: Value Line Investment Survey 
Table 8 
Closing Prices and Percent Changes 
Standard & Poors 
Year 500 Index Eastman-Kodak Polaroid 
Price % Change Price % Change Price % Change 
1970 92.15 75.375 77 
1971 102.09 +10.8 94.25 +25.0 89 +15.6 
1972 111.58 + 9.3 148.375 +57.4 126.125 +41. 7 
1973 107.43 - 3.7 116 -21.8 69.875 -44.6 
1974 68.56 -36.2 62.875 -45.8 18.625 -73.3 
1975 90.19 +56.1 106.125 +68.8 31 +66.4 
1976 107.46 +19.1 86 -19.0 38.875 +25.4 
1977 95.10 -11.5 51.125 -40.5 26.125 -32.8 
1978 96.11 + 1.1 58.625 +14.7 51.75 +98.1 
1979 107.94 +12.3 48.125 -17.9 28 -45.9 
1980 135.76 +25.8 69.75 +44.9 25 -10.7 
1981 122.55 - 9.7 71. 125 + 2.0 20.5 -18.0 
1982 140.64 +14.8 86 +20.9 25.25 +23.2 
1983 164.93 +17.3 76.125 -11.5 33.5 +32.7 
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